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1. Introduction
The recent interaction between Game Theory and Theoretical Computer Science has led to a deep study of the
computational issues underlying basic game-theoretic notions. A prominent subject of these studies is the hardness of
computing Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games [19]. Recent results established evidence of hardness for this problem
[6,10]. Even in the two-player case, the best algorithmknownhas an exponentialworst-case running time [22]. Furthermore,
when one requires equilibria with simple additional properties, the problem immediately becomes NP-hard [9,12].
Motivated by these negative results, recent studies considered the problem of computing other classes of equilibria, such
as pure or correlated equilibria [11,20]. Herewe consider uniform equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria inwhich all the strategies
played with nonzero probability are played with the same probability. Uniform equilibria can be viewed as falling between
pure and mixed Nash equilibria; playing a uniform strategy is arguably the simplest way of mixing pure strategies. Uniform
strategies are also easier to implement and thus may be seen as a model for bounded rationality [21].
Despite the apparent simplicity of uniform equilibria, we show that even for a very constrained class of games, called
imitation simple bimatrix games [8], the associated existence problem is NP-complete. An imitation simple bimatrix game is
a two-player game inwhich the payoffs of both players are in the set {0, 1} and the payoff of the row player (the imitator) is 1
if and only if hemakes the samemove as the opponent. We show that it isNP-complete to decide if a given imitation simple
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bimatrix game has a uniform Nash equilibrium.1 Our proof is essentially graph-theoretical as it relies on a correspondence
between equilibrium strategies and some structures in the digraph implicit in the payoff matrix of the column player.
Motivated by this correspondence, we also give NP-completeness results for other natural problems concerning regular
subgraphs. In particular, we prove that it isNP-complete to decide if a graph has an induced regular subgraph of size at least
k, or if it has an induced regular subgraph of regularity at least k, where k is given as input.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After discussing related work in Section 1.1, we give the introductory
definitions and notation in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we explain how the game-theoretic hardness result follows from
the graph-theoretic result, andwe establish the hardness of finding uniform equilibria. The other regular subgraph problems
are considered in Section 4.
1.1. Related work
As noted above, there has been a considerable amount of work on the complexity of finding mixed Nash equilibria in
normal-form games [8–10,12,13], culminating in the result by Chen and Deng [6] that finding amixed equilibrium in a two-
player game is a problem complete for the class PPAD (defined in Ref. [19]). Also, win–lose games have been shown to be
as expressive as general games when one considers mixed equilibria [1].
Pure equilibria in many kinds of succinct games have also been studied recently [11,14]. On the other hand, we are not
aware of previous work on uniform equilibria. However, a related result by Lipton et al. [17] is that if we only require an
equilibrium that is the best response within an accuracy , then a subexponential algorithm is possible, and the strategies
found are uniform on a multiset of size logarithmic in the number of pure strategies. Our setting differs in that we consider
strategies uniform on a support set, as opposed to amultiset, and we do not limit the size of the support.
Our work exploits a connection between uniform equilibria and certain graph structures associated to win–lose games.
Similar relations for other classes of equilibria have appeared in other recent works [2,7,18].
Problems related to the existence of certain induced subgraphs have been studied in several works, in particular by Lewis
[16] and Yannakakis [23]. Notably, these works showed that so-called hereditary properties of graphs give rise to NP-hard
induced subgraph problems (a property is hereditary if it holds for any induced subgraph of G whenever it holds for G).
However, this result does not apply to the problems we consider, since the property of being a regular subgraph is not
hereditary. More recently, the problem of finding large induced subgraphs of fixed regularity has been studied by Cardoso
et al. [5], who established hardness of the problem, and by Gupta et al. [15], who gave exact exponential-time algorithms
that are faster than the naive enumerative approach.
2. Definitions and notation
We consider simple bimatrix games in normal form. These are specified by two (0, 1) payoff matrices A and B. The first
(resp., second) player is called the row (resp., column) player. It will be enough to consider n × n matrices. The rows and
columns of both matrices are indexed by the pure strategies of the players. We denote the set of pure strategies of each
player by [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
Amixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure strategies, that is, a vector x ∈ Rn such that∑i xi = 1 and for every
i ∈ [n], xi ≥ 0. The support supp(x) of a mixed strategy x is the set of pure strategies i such that xi > 0. When the row player
plays mixed strategy x and the column player plays mixed strategy y, their expected payoffs will be, respectively, xtAy and
xtBy. A mixed strategy x is uniform if for every i ∈ supp(x), xi = 1/|supp(x)|.
A Nash equilibrium of the game (A, B) is a pair of mixed strategies (x, y) from which neither player has an incentive to
deviate: for allmixed strategies x and y, xtAy ≥ xtAy and xtBy ≥ xtBy. A uniform equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium inwhich both
players play uniform strategies. A uniform equilibrium strategy is a uniform strategy played in some uniform equilibrium.
We will consider only imitation simple bimatrix games. A bimatrix game is an imitation game if the row player, called
the imitator, has payoff 1 if he plays the same pure strategy as the opponent, and 0 otherwise. Thus, in an imitation simple
bimatrix game matrix A is the identity matrix In. We will only consider games (In, B) where the matrix B is zero along the
main diagonal — otherwise a pure equilibrium clearly exists.
We now describe our graph-theoretical notation. Given a digraph G = (V, E), we will use G(S) to denote the subgraph
induced by the nodes in the subset S ⊆ V . When the digraph G is clear from the context, with slight abuse of notationwewill
also use S to refer to the induced subgraph G(S). If v ∈ V , as a shorthand for S ∪ {v} we will write S + v. We will use d−(v, S)
to denote the in-degree of v in G(S). In Section 4 we use a similar notation d(v, S) in the case of an undirected graph.
1 In a preliminary version of this work we proved a hardness result for the problem of finding a uniform equilibrium with support of size at most (or at
least) k, where k is given in the input [4]. This result is clearly implied by the result of the present paper.
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Fig. 1. Induced subgraph S1 is a DRIS in G, while S2 is not.
3. Games and graphs
3.1. Uniform equilibria and induced subgraphs
In this section we formulate our result on uniform equilibria and explain its connection with regular subgraph problems.
Let uniformnash be the problem of deciding the existence of a uniformNash equilibrium in an explicitly given imitation
simple bimatrix game. Our main result is the following.
Theorem 1. uniform nash is NP-complete.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we define certain subgraph structures (Definition 2) and we show that they are tightly
related to uniform Nash equilibria in the game associated to a given graph (Lemma 5). We then show that finding such
structures in a given graph is an NP-complete problem (Lemma 8), from which the NP-completeness of uniform nashwill
follow.
The graph-theoretic definition we will need in order to prove Theorem 1 is the following.
Definition 2. Let G = (V, E) be a digraph. We call a set S ⊆ V a dominant-regular induced subgraph (DRIS) of G if there is an
integer r such that
(i) for all v ∈ S, d−(v, S) = r;
(ii) for all v ∈ V , d−(v, S+ v) ≤ r.
Fig. 1 shows a digraph G and two induced subgraphs, only one of which is a DRIS in G.
Proposition 3. Given a digraph G = (V, E), S ⊆ V is a DRIS in G if and only if S is a DRIS in G(T) for all T such that S ⊆ T ⊆ V .
Proof. Immediate from Definition 2. 
Proposition 4. Given a DRIS S in a digraph G, if T ⊆ S and there is no arc from S− T to T in G, then T is a DRIS in G.
Proof. For all v ∈ T, d−(v, T) = d−(v, S) by the assumption that no arc can cross the cut (S− T, T). Thus there is an r such that
part (i) of Definition 2 holds. Part (ii) holds because T ⊆ S, thus d−(v, T + v) ≤ d−(v, S+ v) ≤ r for any node v. 
Our proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. Let Γ = (In,M) be an imitation simple bimatrix game and let G be the digraph whose adjacency matrix is M. Then Γ
has a uniform equilibrium if and only if G has a DRIS.
Proof. Let S be a dominant-regularity induced subgraph with in-degree r. Consider the unique uniform strategy x having
support S (that is, xi = 1/|S| if i ∈ S and xi = 0 otherwise). We show that (x, x) is a uniform equilibrium. By the definition of
x, |S|xtM is a row vector whose ith coordinate gives the in-degree of node i in G(S). But then, by definition of a DRIS, xtM is
maximal on coordinates i ∈ S; thus, if the row player plays x, the column player has no incentive to deviate from x. But if the
second player plays x, the vector of incentives for the first player is Inx = x and hence (x, x) is a uniform equilibrium for Γ .
In the other direction, let (x, y) be a uniform equilibrium. We show that supp(x) is a DRIS. Since the game is an imitation
game, it can be easily verified that the support of x has to be included in the support of y. Let S = supp(x). Since the column
player has no incentive to deviate, for every l ∈ [n] and for every i ∈ supp(y), and in particular for every i ∈ S, (xtM)i ≥ (xtM)l.
Now |S|(xtM)i =∑j∈S Mji so we have
d−(i, S) =∑
j∈S
Mji ≥
∑
j∈S
Mjl = d−(l, S+ l)
for every i ∈ S and l ∈ N. Thus S is a dominant-regularity induced subgraph in G. 
Let dominant-regular induced subgraph be the problem of deciding whether a given digraph admits a DRIS. Then
Lemma 5 immediately implies the following.
Corollary 6. There is a polynomial-time reduction from dominant-regular induced subgraph to uniform nash.
Incidentally, we observe that the problem of deciding the existence of a uniform equilibrium always has a positive
answer if we consider imitation simple bimatrix games (In,M)withM symmetric: any maximal clique in the corresponding
undirected graph is a DRIS and so it corresponds to a uniform equilibrium by Lemma 5.
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Fig. 2. The gadget used in Lemma 7.
Fig. 3. Example of a graph with no DRIS.
3.2. Hardness of finding dominant-regular subgraphs
In this section we conclude the proof of Theorem 1 by showing that dominant-regular induced subgraph is NP-
complete. The Theorem will then follow by Corollary 6.
We start by observing that in a general digraph the existence of a DRIS is not guaranteed.
Lemma 7. For every k > 0, there is a graph G = (V, E) with |V| = 4k that has no DRIS and that contains an independent set of
size k.
Proof. G is constructed by starting from a cycle on k nodes and then replacing the ith node of the cycle with the 4-node
gadget in Fig. 2. Fig. 3 shows the resulting graph when k = 6.
Clearly the nodes ci form an independent set of size k. To show that no S ⊆ V can be a DRIS in G, first notice that the only
possible values r could take are 0, 1 and 2. We thus consider three cases.
Case r = 0. It is clearly impossible that S = V . But then there exists a node v /∈ Swith d−(v, S+ v) > 0, contradiction.
Case r = 1. In this case it is easy to verify that S should include some ci or c′i . Assume that ci ∈ S. Then c′i /∈ S, otherwise
d−(a′i, S + a′i) > 1, violating condition (ii) in Definition 2. So for ci to have in-degree 1 in S, ai has to be in S. But then
d−(c′i, S+ c′i) > 1.
Case r = 2. Since d−(ai, V) = 1, S does not include any ai. If S includes any node a′i , it should also include its two in-
neighbors ci, c′i , and by the same argument also ai, contradiction. Similarly we get a contradiction if S contains any node
ci or c′i . 
Lemma 8. dominant-regular induced subgraph is NP-complete.
We prove the lemma by reduction from 3sat. We show that given any 3sat instance, we can construct a digraph that has
a DRIS if and only if the 3sat instance is satisfiable.
Thus, consider a 3CNF formula f inwhich,wlog, no clause contains both a variable and its negation. Let the sets of variables
and clauses of f be {x1, . . . , xn} and {c1, . . . , cm} respectively. There is one node in our digraph G = (V, E) for each literal of
f , and one node for each clause. G also contains an additional node x0. We denote by X the set of nodes corresponding to
literals and to x0, and by C the set of nodes corresponding to clauses, so that V = X ∪ C. Arcs are as follows:
• an arc from each literal node xi to each other node in X − {xi};
• an arc from x0 to each other node in X;
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Fig. 4. The graph constructed in the proof of Lemma 8.
• an arc to each node Cj from all the nodes in X except the three corresponding to the literals that form Cj.
Fig. 4 shows the graph corresponding to a generic 3sat instance.
We begin by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 9. The graph G has the following properties:
(i) if f is satisfiable, then G has a DRIS S ⊆ X such that |S| = n+ 1;
(ii) if S ⊆ X is a DRIS in G, then f is satisfiable.
Proof. (i) Consider a satisfying assignment for f . Let S the subset of X corresponding to the literals having value true in
this assignment, plus the node x0. Note that |S| = n+1, since for each variable xi only one between xi and xi can be true.
Now S is a DRIS in G: d−(x, S+ x) = n for each x ∈ X, and d−(c, S+ c) ≤ n for all c ∈ C because at least one of the literals
appearing in c is true.
(ii) Let S ⊆ X be a DRIS in G. S must contain x0, otherwise the second condition in Definition 2 is violated. Thus d−(v, S) =
d−(x0, S) for each v ∈ S. It follows that for each i ∈ [n] at most one of the two nodes xi, xi can be included in S: otherwise
xi and x0 would have different in-degrees in S, violating the first condition in Definition 2. On the other hand, S must
contain at least one of xi, xi, otherwise
d−(xi, S+ xi) = |S| > d−(x0, S).
So indeed |S| = n+ 1 and the literals corresponding to S define a truth assignment. This assignment satisfies f because
for each clause c,
d−(c, S+ c) ≤ d−(x0, S) = n,
thus there is a node x ∈ S such that (x, c) is not an arc of G, meaning that cmust contain at least one true literal. 
Notice that Lemma 9 implies that dominant-regular induced subgraph is NP-hard if we additionally require the DRIS
to be contained in some specified subset X of the nodes. To relax this assumption, we enrich our graph G constructed from
f as follows: consider the graph G0 = (V0, E0) obtained by applying the construction in Lemma 7 with k = n. Let G′ be the
union of G and G0 (notice that G and G0 share the nodes c1, . . . , cm).
Lemma 10. The graph G′ has the following properties:
(i) if f is satisfiable, then G′ has a DRIS;
(ii) if G′ has a DRIS, then f is satisfiable.
Proof. Part (i) can be proved exactly as Lemma 9(i). To prove (ii), first notice that G′(V) = G and G′(V0) = G0, as in G′ there
is no arc of the form (ci, cj).
Now let S be a DRIS in G′. Then S * V0, otherwise S would also be a DRIS in G0, contradicting Lemma 7. Thus S ∩ X is
nonempty. Since by construction G′ contains no arc from V ∪ V0 − X to X, and in particular no arc from S− (S∩ X) to S∩ X, by
Proposition 4 S ∩ X is also a DRIS in G′. Then, by Proposition 3, S ∩ X is a DRIS in G′(V) = G. We can conclude by Lemma 9(ii)
that f is satisfiable. 
Lemma 8 now immediately follows from Lemma 10 and the NP-hardness of 3sat.
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Fig. 5. The graph constructed in the proof of Theorem 11.
4. Hardness of other regular subgraph problems
In this section we give NP-completeness results for other natural variations of the problem of finding regular induced
subgraphs. In particular, we show that both of the following problems are NP-complete.
maximum regular induced subgraph (max-ris)
Instance: a graph G(V, E) and an integer k.
Question: is there a set S ⊆ V such that G(S) is regular and |S| ≥ k?
maximum-regularity induced subgraph (max-rris)
Instance: a graph G(V, E) and an integer k.
Question: is there a set S ⊆ V such that G(S) is r-regular, for some r ≥ k?
Theorem 11. max-ris is NP-complete.
Proof. Consider a generic instance of 3sat consisting of a formula f with m clauses over n variables; we assume, wlog, that
m = 2q for some integer q > 1: note that it is always possible to build such a formula f ′, satisfiable if and only if f is, by
adding at most m copies of a clause of f . We create the corresponding instance of max-ris as follows (see Fig. 5):
• for each clause ci we add three nodes, denoted by ci,1, ci,2 and ci,3, one for each literal in ci; we denote by L the set of all
these nodes;
• for each clause ci we also add three auxiliary nodes, denoted by ci,0, c′i,0 and c′i,1;
• for 1 ≤ i ≤ mwe connect
- ci,0 with ci,1, ci,2 and ci,3;
- c′i,1 with ci,1, ci,2 and ci,3;
- c′i,0 with ci,0 and c′i,1;
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• we add two binary trees T1 and T2, where |T1| = |T2| = 2m − 1. Note that both T1 and T2 have m leaves; for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
we connect the ith leaf of T1 with ci,0, ci,1, ci,2 and ci,3; the ith leaf of T2 is connected with c′i,0 and c′i,1; finally we connect
together the two roots;
• for 1 ≤ i, i′ ≤ m and 1 ≤ t, t′ ≤ 3 we connect ci,t with ci′,t′ if and only if they correspond to opposed literals;
• we set k := 8m− 2.
Note that in the graph defined above, the following nodes have degree 3: all the internal nodes in T1, all the nodes in T2 and
the nodes c′i,0. We denote by Q the set of all the other nodes, i.e. the nodes x such that d(x, V) 6= 3.
We first show that if f is satisfiable the instance ofmax-ris has a solution. Given a truth assignment function that satisfies
f , pick, for each clause ci, exactly one true literal ci,t . Let S include all the nodes in V − L together with the m nodes, in L,
corresponding to the literals selected in this way. Then |S| = 8m − 2 = k, and since the truth assignment satisfies f there
cannot be an edge between any two nodes in S ∩ L. Therefore for all v ∈ Swe have that d(v, S) = 3, i.e. G(S) is regular.
Now assume that max-ris has a solution S, where G(S) is r-regular and |S| ≥ 8m− 2. We show that this implies that f is
satisfiable by proving the following points:
(1) r ≥ 3;
(2) S * Q;
(3) S determines a truth assignment that satisfies f .
(1) Assume by contradiction that r ≤ 2; note that at most three nodes between ci,0, ci,1, ci,2, ci,3 and the ith leaf of T1
belong to S. Furthermore, not all the internal nodes of T1 and the nodes of T2 (remember that the size of both T1 and
T2 is 2m − 1) can be included in S because there will be at least two nodes (the roots) with degree 3. It follows that
|S| < 3m+ (3m− 2)+ 2m = 8m− 2 (here 2m is the total number of nodes c′i,0 and c′i,1).
(2) If S = Q , for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, d(ci,0, S) = 4 and d(c′i,1, S) = 3, it follows that G(S) is not regular. If S ⊂ Q then|S| < 6m ≤ 8m− 2.
(3) From the previous point |S− Q| > 0, so there must be x ∈ S such that d(x, V) = 3. Using (1), all the nodes connected to x
must belong to S, and, in particular, at least one node either in T1 or in T2; due to the recursive structure of the trees all the
nodes of T1 and T2 must belong to S. Now consider the leaves of T2: their degree must be 3, and this implies that c′i,0 ∈ S and
c′i,1 ∈ S for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m; similarly, ci,0 ∈ S for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence, of each triple ci,1, ci,2 and ci,3, exactly one node must be
in S so that, for any i and any leaf v of T1, d(v, S) = 3.
We denote by LS the set of nodes in L that belong to S, i.e. LS = S∩ L. Note that (i) |LS| = m, and there is exactly one node in LS
for each clause, and (ii) there cannot be an edge between two nodes in LS, otherwise their degree would be greater than 3.
Therefore from LS we can derive a truth assignment by setting true the literals of f corresponding to nodes in LS. The truth
assignment is valid because of (ii), while f is satisfied because of (i). 
Theorem 12. max-rris is NP-complete.
Proof. We transform 3sat to max-rris. The instance of 3sat is a formula f with m clauses and n variables and, without loss
of generality, we assume that m ≥ 2 and that there is no clause c that includes two opposite literals. Note that for each
formula f there is a formula f ′, with m′ = 3(m− 1) clauses and n′ = n+ 1 variables, such that f ′ is satisfiable if and only if f
is satisfiable: we build f ′ by adding 2m − 3 identical clauses that include only one literal, corresponding to a new variable,
repeated three times. We now transform the generic instance of f ′ into an instance of max-rris in the following way (see
Fig. 6):
• for each clause ci we add
. three nodes ci,1, ci,2 and ci,3; they represent the literals of the clause, and we refer to all of them, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m′, as the
set L;
. three nodes ai, bi and ci; let A, B and C denote, respectively, the set of all the nodes ai, bi and ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ m′;
. the following sets of nodes: Ai,1, Ai,2, Ai,3, Bi; each of these sets has cardinality equal to m′;
• we add two root nodes, denoted by r1 and r2;
• we connect each node in a set Ai,1, Ai,2, Ai,3, Bi with all the nodes in the same set, i.e. all these sets are cliques of size m′;
• we connect
. each node ai with all the nodes in Ai,1 ∪ Ai,2 ∪ Ai,3;
. each node bi with all the nodes in Bi;
. each node ci with all the nodes in Bi;
. each node ci,1 with all the nodes in Ai,1;
. each node ci,2 with all the nodes in Ai,2;
. each node ci,3 with all the nodes in Ai,3;
• we connect each node ci with the corresponding nodes ci,1, ci,2 and ci,3;
• we connect r1 with each node ai and the node r2 with each node bi;
• we connect r1 to r2;
• we connect each occurrence of a literal ci,j with all occurrences ci′,j′ that represent the opposite literal;
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Fig. 6. The graph constructed in the proof of Theorem 12.
• finally, we let k := m′ + 1.
We now show that if f ′ is satisfiable then there is a solution S to the corresponding instance of max-rris. Consider a truth
assignment satisfying f ′. We build S in the following way: for each clause we arbitrarily pick one node ci,t that corresponds
to a true literal, and we also include in S the corresponding set Ai,t . Additionally, we include for 1 ≤ i′ ≤ m′ all nodes ai′ , bi′ ,
ci′ , all the sets Bi′ and the two roots r1 and r2. It is easy to verify that such a set S induces a (m′ + 1)-regular graph on G (since
the nodes ci,t are chosen according to a truth assignment, no pair of nodes in S ∩ L is connected by an edge).
Now assume that S ⊆ V is a solution of max-rris, i.e. it is a set inducing an r-regular subgraph with r ≥ m′ + 1. To show
that this implies that f ′ is satisfiable we prove the following points:
1. S * L;
2. for each set X ∈ {Ai,1, Ai,2, Ai,3, Bi}, if S ∩ X 6= ∅, then X ⊂ S;
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3. if ci ∈ S then Bi ⊂ S;
4. if S ∩ Ai,t 6= ∅ then ai ∈ S;
5. if ai ∈ S ∩ A then there is exactly one t ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that Ai,t ⊂ S;
6. S ∩ L determines a truth assignment that satisfies f ′.
(1) Each node ci,t is connected to at most 3(m − 1) nodes in L, where 3(m − 1) < 3m − 2 = m′ + 1: we built f ′ from f , and
only the nodes that correspond to the literals in f (3m literals) can be connected together. If we consider only nodes in L it is
not possible to reach the minimum degree k = m′ + 1.
(2) Note that X is a clique of sizem′, and every node in X is connected to only two nodes not in X. Therefore, if a node x belongs
to S ∩ X, to reach the minimum degree m′ + 1 all the nodes connected to it must belong to S, so that X ⊂ S.
(3) If ci ∈ S, since m′ + 1 > 3 there is β ∈ S ∩ Bi, so by (2) Bi ⊂ S.
(4) Let α ∈ S∩Ai,t . Since d(α, V) = m′+1, to achieve degreem′+1 all the neighbors of αmust be in S, and in particular ai ∈ S.
(5) Consider a node ai ∈ S ∩ A; since m′ + 1 > 1 there must be a node α ∈ S ∩ Ai,t . From (2) it follows that Ai,t ⊂ S. If there
were also a node α′ ∈ S ∩ Ai,t′ , with t′ 6= t, then we would similarly have Ai,t′ ⊂ S. But then the degree of ai in S would be
d(ai, S) ≥ 2m′ > m′ + 1 = d(α, S) and so the induced subgraph would not be regular; this implies the uniqueness of Ai,t .
(6) From (1) we know that S − L 6= ∅. By (2–5) and the fact that d(r1, V) = d(r2, V) = d(bi, V) = m′ + 1, one can deduce
that for each triple ci,1, ci,2, ci,3, there is only one t such that ci,t ∈ S. Moreover this implies Ai,t ⊂ S and ci ∈ S, so that G(S)
must be m′ + 1 regular and ci,t is only connected to ci and the set Ai,t . This means that in S ∩ L there cannot be two adjacent
nodes, i.e. among the literals in S ∩ L there is no pair of opposite literals. Therefore it is possible to assign the value true
to all the literals whose corresponding nodes are in S ∩ L; this gives a truth assignment which satisfies f ′ and, hence, also
satisfies f . 
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